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RECENT CASES.
BANKRUPTCY-EFFECT OF DISCHARGE-JUDGMENT FOR DAMAGES FOR CRIMI-
NAL CONVERSATION.-TINKER V. COLWELL, 24 SUP. CT. 505. Held, that a
judgment for damages for criminal conversation is one recovered in an action
"for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another"
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, (30 Stat. at L. 550), par. 17, subd.
2, excepting judgments recovered in such actions from the operation of a dis-
charge in bankruptcy. Brown, White, and Holmes, JJ., dissenting.
It is by a very just, and well written, liberal interpretation of the statute
that this decision is maintained. If interpreted according to strict logic, the
statute might have caused this decision to have gone the other way. For
criminal conversation can hardly be said to be malicious toward the husband,
unless malice be specifically proved. Livergood v. Greer, 43 Ill. 213; Ander-
son v. Howe, 116 N. Y. 342; Com. v. Williams, iio Mass. 4O. Nor can it
be said to be an injury either to his person; Ryall v. Kennedy, 52 How. Prac.
517; or to his property. In Re Haensell, 91 Fed. 355.
BANKRUPTCY-FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-SUIT TO SET ASIDE.-BEASLEY
V. COGGINS, 12 A. B. R. 355.-This was a suit brought by a trustee in bank-
ruptcy to set aside a conveyance made by the bankrupt. No creditor had
reduced a claim to judgment. Held, that a trustee in bankruptcy may file a
bill in equity to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real estate though neither
he nor any creditor has reduced a claim against the bankrupt to judgment;
A creditor must reduce his claim to judgment or exhaust his legal reme-
dies before he can maintain a bill in equity to set aside a fraudulent convey-
ance of his debtor. Ellis v. S. W. L. Co., IO8 Wis. 313; Case v'. Beauregard,
x1 U. S. 69o; Shellington v. Howland, 53 N. Y. 371. The right of action to
recover property fraudulently conveyed prior to adjudication is exclusively in
the trustee. Glenny v. Langdon, o8 U. S. 2o; Trimble v. Woodhead, 102
U. S. 647; Pratt v. Curtis, 6 N. B. R. 139. If a trustee could not attack a fraud-
ulent conveyance which creditors are not permitted to attack the act would be
a device to permit a fraudulent c6nveyance to take effect, provided it might be
concealed for the specified four months. In re Gray, 3 A. B. R. 647; In re
Leland, io Blatchf. 647. The Bankruptcy Act vested the trustee with the title
of all the property fraudulently conveyed by the bankrupt and he acquires, his
right of action through the Act and not through what may have been -done by
the creditors. In re Tollett, IO5 Fed. 425; In re Duncan, 14 N. B. R. 33;
Section 70-A, Bankruitcy -Act. The late case of Sheldon v. Parker, ziA. B,
R. i9 is directly in point on this question and holds that the law under which
the trustee is appointed authorizes him to bring and maintain actions of this
character. Mueller v'. Bruss, 112 Wis. 406; Hood v. Bank, 91 N. W. 701.
BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION-ADVERSE CLAIM-CONSENT.-IN RE ADAMS,
12 A. B. R. 367.-Held, that the merits of a claim to property received from
the bankrupt before the filing of his petition as a part payment of a debt and
RECENT CASES.
without reasonable cause to believe that it- was intended thereby to give a
preference cannot be determined on a summary petition, against the claim-
ant's objection.
In the case of In re N. Y. Car Wheel W., 132 Fed. 203, the court says:
"A referee is without jurisdiction in a summary proceeding to require a third
person to turn over to a trustee in bankruptcy money or property to which he
asserts an adverse claim, where such claim is made with the apparent inten-
tion to defend the same and is not merely colorable." Sec. 23-A Bankruptcy
Act; American Trust Co. of Pittsburgh V. Wallis, 126 Fed. 464; Bardes v.
Hawarden Bank, 178 U. S. 524. It is otherwise when the claim is asserted
in fraud of creditors or is merely colorable. In re Knickerbocker, 121 Fed.
oo4; In re Michie, ix6 Fed. 749; Boyd v. Glucklick, 1z6 Fed. 131. Or
when the adverse claimant invokes the jurisdiction of the bankrupt court. In
re D. H. McBride &- Co., 132 Fed. 285. When it is shown that a claim is
adversely asserted with an apparent intention to protect the same by the usual
process of the law, the bankruptcy court is bound to exercise its power with
cautious discretion. In re Kane, 131 Fed 386. The court says in In re
Teschmacher, Ii A. B. R. 547, that "the adverse claimant is entitled to have
his contention examined and judged according to the ordinary and regular
process of law."
BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION-INVOLUNTAR-Y PETITION-AMENDMENT.-IN RE
STEIN, 12 A. B. R- 364.-An involuntary petition was filed with all necessary
averments to give the court jurisdiction but with a deficiency in the amount.
A demurrer was filed'and on the same day additional claims were also filed to
cure the defect in the petition.-Held, that an involuntary petition may not
be amended by joining other creditors with claims enough to make up the
$5oo requisite to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
The court has jurisdiction only when the averments are set out according
to the Bankruptcy Act. In re Scammon, 6 Biss. X3o; In re Burch, io N. B. R.
i5o; In ri Rosenfield, ii N. B. I. 86. Amendment will be allowed if the
original petition alleges a sufficient number of petitioners, other averments
being as required, though it is subsequently discovered that there is a defic-
iency. In re Stein, 1o5 Fed. 749. Also, in case subsequent proceedings
develop that the provable claims did not amount to the required sum as set
forth in the Iletition, the court will retain jurisdiction and allow ameidment.
Colliers Bankrulcy, 330; In re Bedding field, 96 Fed. i8o. The court
distinguishes these cases on the ground that jurisdiction had been assumed
and it is upheld in this opinion by the dicta in In re Mackey, 6 A, B. R.
577, and in In re Mammoth Pine &- L. Co., 1o9 Fed. 308. Cases of this kind
are not likely to arise except through clerical error, as did this one.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-PUBLIC NUISANCE-ABATEMENT.-
MCCONNELL V. McKILLUP, 99 N. W. 505 (NnB.).-Held, that a statutory pro-
vision subjecting property of a nature innocent in itself and subject to bene-
ficial use to forfeiture to the state for unlawful user, without providing for a
hearing, deprives the owner of his property without due process of law.
Forfeitures are not adjudgable by legislative act, except it may be for a
violation of the revenue laws. U. S. v. Brig folek, 2 How. 216; Hender-
son's D. S., 14 Wall. 414. The legislature has the right to authorize judicial
proceedings to be taken for the condemnation of property which they have
declared to be a nuisance. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; Wurts V.
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Hoagland, Ir4 U. S. 6o6. A city ordinance which authorizes the seizure and
sale of certain animals running at large divests the owner of his property
without due process of law. Donovan v. M. &- C. of Vicksburg, 29 Miss.
248; Poaijen v. Homes, 44 Ill. 362. A law authorizing the destruction of
gaming tables, which are Per se public nuisances, without trial and compen-
sation, was held unconstitutional in Lowry v.Rainwater, 70 MO. 152, but this
is opposed by M. M, Co. v. Van Keuren, 23 N. J. Eq. 251; Cooley, Consi.
Lim. 572; Coe v. Schultz, 47 Barb. 64; and these last citations are upheld in
Com. v. Kelley, 163 Mass. 169; Cook v. Gregg, 46 N. Y. 439, as to articles,
such as fishing nets, declared by statute to be 25er se nuisances. The legisla-
ture could not decree the forfeiture of property, not a nuisance ecr se, because
it is used in committing a nuisance. Com. v. Coffee, 9 Grey 134: Gray v.
Ayers, 7 Dana 375. The power to abate a nuisance does not extend to the
destruction of private property used in creating such nuisance, which is
susceptible of use for a lawful purpose. Chicago v. U. S. & T. Co., 154 Ill.
224.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EQUAL PROTECTION-TAXATION-PRIVATE CORPORA-
TION.-ST. Louis, ETC., R. Co. v. DAvis, 132 FED. 629.-Held, that the
fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the U. S. forbidding any state
from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws," is not violated by a tax on railroad property to nearly its full value
when other property in the state is valued at only about 30%.
A state is prohibited by the fourteenth amendment from discriminating
between different persons of a class. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac.
R., 118 U. S. 394. It may, however, impose different taxes on different
classes, provided the classification is reasonable. Railroad Tax Cases, 13
Fed. 722. What is reasonable depends upon the particular circumstances in
each case. The supreme court in Mobile, etc., R. Co., v. Tenn., 153 U. S.
486, declined to state what would constitute reasonableness. In Nashville,
etc., R. Co. v. Taylor, 86 Fed. 168, it was declared unreasonable to single out
and subject a special class of persons to oppressive taxation. To constitute
railroad property a special class and tax it disproportionately, this being the
only railroad in the state, would probably ordinarily be held unreasonable.
CORPORATIONS -PRIVATE- DIRECTORS- TRUSTEES FOR STOCKHOLDERS.-
STEWART V. HARRIS, 77 PAC. 277 (KAN.).-Held, that where a director buys
stock of a stockholder, he occupies such a fiduciary relation to the stockholder
as to require a full disclosure of matters affecting the value of the stock.
The directors are not trustees for either the corporation or its stockholders
in the strict sense of the term. Hasfies v. Car Co., 48 Minn. 174; Deaderick
v. Wilson, 8 Baxt. 1o8. They are agents of the stockholders as a body, and
not individually. Allen v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 456; Smith v. Hurd, 12 Mete.
371; Marshall, Cori., 565, 1022. The weight of authority is to the effect that
in dealings between them and stockholders involving stock transfers, they are
in the position of strangers. Deaderick v. Wilson, sufira; Board of Comm.
v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 5o9; Carfienter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581. But these
same cases imply that, as regards the management of corporate affairs, they
are quasi-trustees for the stockholders. See also 3 Pom. -E. fur. iogo. And
a very well reasoned opinion in Oliver v. Oliver, II8 Ga. 362, holds them to
be so far fiduciaries toward the stockholders as to require, in the purchase of
stock'from them, a full disclosure of all material particulars. But purchases
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in open market are perhaps to be distinguished from those at private sale. As
against subscribers for stock, there must be a full disclosure in prospectuses
of a company. New Brunswick BRy. v. Muggeridge, I Dr. & Sm. 363;
a Por. Eq. Jur. 881; and for any failure in this respect the directors may be
held. Edgingon v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div. 459; Cent. Ry. v. Kisch, L. R.
2 H. L. 99.
CRIMINAL LAW-FORMER JEOPARDY-SINGLENESS OF TRANSACTION.-MANN
V. COMMONWEALTH, 80 S. W. 438 (Ky.). Defendants broke into a house at
night with intent to steal money, which they abstracted from the householder's
pocket, and on his awakening shot him. Held, that the burglary and the
shooting do not constitute a single transaction out of which two offences can-
not be carved, so as to render a conviction of the shooting a bar to the prose-
cution of burglary.
The concurrence of opinion among the courts of the various states with
the above decision is quite general. The same individual may at the same
time and in the same transaction commit two or more distinct crimes, and an
acquittal of one will not be a bar to punishment for the other. State vz.
Standfer, 5 Porter 523. In Peojble v. Warren, I Parker C. C. 338, a trial
and acquittal on an indictment for an attempted killing of one was considered
no bar to a subsequent indictment charging the same defendant with attempt-
ing to kill another by the same act. Nevertheless a decision essentially
contrary to these was rendered by the court of Vermont in State vz. Damon,
2 Tyler 39o, but it is said in a note to Archibald's Crim. Pr. & P., 112 to be
against the weight of authority and repugnant to reason, and by Bennett &*
Heard, L. C. C., 534 to be clearly not law.
CRIMINAL LAw-SECURING EVIDENCE-PARTICIPATION IN ACT BY HIM
AGAINST WHOM IT IS COMMITTED.-PEOPLE V. MILLS, 7o N. E. 786 (N. Y.).-
A district-attorney, being informed of a plot to make away with certain pend-
ing indictments, himself obtained them and secured their -delivery to the
accused by one of his agents, in pretended furtherance of the scheme. Held,
that nevertheless the accused was guilty of the crime of stealing them.
O'Brien and Bartlett, JJ., dissenting.
Consent to a crime by him against whom it is committed is ordinarily no
defense. Reg. v. Clisin., 8 Car. & P. 418; 1 Bish. Cr. Law, 259. Nor can
the participation avail where the accused has himself committed all the essent-
ial acts. State v. Jansen, 22 Kan. 498; State v. Hayes, 105 MO. 76. Under
this rule would fall those cases where the crime is more directly against
the peace of the state and the agent, by becoming a party to it, furnishes the
opportunity for its commission, as in the illegal sale of lottery tickets. Peofile
v. Noelke, 94 N. Y. 137. But where the crime is against an individual and
he instigates it, there would seem to be no liability on the part of the accused.
O'Brien vz. State, 6 Tex. App. 665; Peoile v. MrcCord, 76 Mich. 2oo; King v.
AcDaniel, 2 East P. C. 665. Nor where consent destroys an essential ele-
ment of the crime; Peopile v. Lifihardt, io5 Mich. 8o; 1 Wharton, Cr. Law
75X i; even though the accused thinks the consenting person is acting merely
as his agent. Williams v. Ga., 55 Ga. 391. But passively to permit a crime
to be committed does not prevent a conviction. Warner v. State, 72 Ga. 745;
State vi. Jansen, supra. And though consent may prevent conviction for one
crime, it may not destroy another cognate to it which is involved in the same
transaction. Reg. v. Johnson, Car. & M. 218.
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DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-MURDE, OF ANCESTOR.-IN RE KUHN'S
ESTATE, OI N. W. isi (IowA).-Held, that a widow who was the murderer
of her husband takes her distributive share of his estate as a matter of contract
and is not deprived by a statute providing that "no person who feloniously
takes the life of another shall inherit from such person any portion of his
estate."
Authority on this point of law is extremely meager. In Owens v. Owens,
Ioo N. C. 240, it was held that a wife who was convicted and imprisoned for
life as an accessory to the murder of her husband is not barred of her right of
dower. This case is criticised in Riggs v. Palmer, 1i5 N. Y. 506, as being
opposed to the fundamental maxims of the common law, such as that no one
shall be allowed to take advantageof his own wrong, or acquire property by
his own crime; the court held that an heir or donee who murdered his ancestor
will not be permitted to have any benefit as such heir or donee. The rule in
New York now is that the murderer takes the title to the property at law but
equity will compel him to hold as trustee ez- malefico, for the representatives
of his victim. The heir was held entitled to the property of his murdered
ancestor in Dum v. Millikin, 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 491; Carenters Estate, 170
Pa. St. 203; Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, overruling on rehear-
ing previous decision in 31 Neb. 61.
EQUITY-I.ECTION.-TRIPP v. NOBLES, 48 S. E. 675 (S. C.).-A husband
provided in his will that his wife should have a life estate in certain real estate
which she already owned and he also left her a certain amount of personal
property. She would have received an equal amount of personal property by
the statute of distributions. Held, that in accepting the personal property
she exercised an equitable election to take under the will and thus was entitled
only to a life estate in the realty. Walker and Douglas, JJ., dissenting.
The dissenting opinion seems to be more in accordance with the general
principles of the law. The doctrine of election, as stated in Bisfiham's Equity,
6th Ed., 418, obtains only when there is a benefit received by the one put
to election. In the present case no extra benefit was received by taking under
the.will. The cases sustaining the majority opinion are those where an actual
benefit was received, although its acceptance entailed greater burdens. The
case of Stone v. Vandermark, 146 Ill. 312, held that acceptance of a provision
which the acceptor would have received anyway did not constitute an implied
election.- Somewhat similar was Comjher v. Comfiher, 25 Pa. 31. Thebetter
rule would seem to be that, when the actions of the distributee are entirely
consistent with taking against the will, election under the will will not be
implied. 2 Story, Eyuity, zi Ed., 375; Edwards v. Morgan, 13 Price 782;
Thurston v, Clfton, 21 Beav. 447.
EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGED CoMMuNIATIoNs-PiysIcIAN-CoNsrauCTION OF
STATUTE.-BATTIS v. CHICAGO, R. I. & P. R. Co., ioo N. W. 543 (IowA).-
Held, that a statute, providing that confidential communications made to a
physician should be privileged, shall be extended to include all knowledge and
information acquired, by the physician, while in his professional capacity.
Deemer, C. J., and Weaver, J., dissenting.
Communications from patient to physician were not privileged at common
law. Boyle v. Northwestern Mut. Relief Assoc., 95 Wise. 320. This was
based on grounds of public justice. Rex v. Gibbons, i C. & P. 97. But in
most states statutes have been enacted making such communications privi-
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leged. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 112 U. S. 250. This is
on the ground of public policy. Davis v. Sufireme Lodge, I65 N. Y. 159.
The privilege extends not only to communications, but to all information
acquired by observation while in attendance. Finnegan V. Sioux City, 112
IOWA 232.
HIGHWAYS-OBSTRUCTION-INJURIES TO ONE COASTING.-REUscH V. LICK-
ING R. M. Co., 8o S. W. I168 (Ky.).-Held, that one coasting on a street
and injured by colliding with a vehicle left standing over night in the street,
cannot recover from the one who, without knowing that the street was being
used for coasting, left the vehicle there.
Coasting in public highways is a nuisance, for it endangers the safety and
comfort of the public, and obstructs the public in the exercise of a right com-
mon to all. Wilmington v. Vandergrft, I Mary. (Del.) 5. On the other
hand, a highway cannot be used as a place for standing or storing vehicles of
any description. Turner v. Holzman, 54 Md. 148; Cohen v. New York, 113
N. Y. 532. And one who permits his property to obstruct a highway is liable
to a traveller who is injured by such obstruction. Linsley v. Bushnell, 15
Conn. 225. But persons who use the highway for purposes of playing are
not travelers. Blodgett '. Boston, 8 Allen (Mass.) 237.
HIGHWAYS- OBSTRUCTIONS -SPECIAL DAMAGES- FERRY. - PARSONS V.
HUNT, 81 S. W. 12o (TEx.).-Held, that when the only road leading to one
terminus of a ferry is closed to travel, the owner of the ferry suffers special
damage, differing in kind and degree from that suffered by the general public.
Persons owning land on a part of a street not closed to travel are not
deprived of any vested right entitling them to compensation when some other
part of the street is so closed. State v. Elizabeth, 54 N. J. L. 462. The fact
that obstructions are of a public character and create a public nuisance gives
no right of action to individuals unless they suffer damage peculiar in kind.
Cummins v. Seymour, 79 Ind. 491. Though one public way is closed, if there
is another still kept open, the property owner sustains no actionable damage,
though he suffer inconvenience and loss thereby. Fearing v. Irwin, 55 N. Y.
486. But it seems that a private right of action arises when access to the
system of public streets is substantially prevented. Stanwood v. Malden,
157 Mass. 17. This decision accords with the present case, in which such
access is equally necessary at each terminus.
INsU RANcE-PRooF OF LOss.-TEUTONIA INS. Co. v. JOHNSON, 82 S. E.
840 (AR.).-Where a fire policy provides that insured shall within 6o days
after the fire furnish proofs of loss. and that no action shall be sustainable till
after compliance with all conditions, nor unless commenced within 12 months
from the date of fire, held, that furnishing such proof within the 60 days is
necessary, and that it is not enough that they are furnished within the year.
A number of well considered cases have decided this question the other
way. Kenton Ins. Co. V. Downs, 90 Ky. 236, where the terms of the policy
were substantially the same as in the principal case; Ins. Asso. v. Evans,
X02 Pa. 281; Tubbs v. Ins. CO., 84 Mich. 646; Steel v. German Ins. Co., 93
Mich. 81, distinguishing the case of Gould v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., go
Mich. 302, where there was an express stipulation making delay in filing proof
of loss a ground for forfeiture of right of action. In New York delay in fur-
nishing proof of loss within the time required by the policy has been held to
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work a forfeiture of a right of action, but the decision is based rather on the
unreasonableness of the delay than on the failure to comply strictly with the
requirements of the policy. Blossom v. Ins. Co., 64 N. Y. 162; 2uinlan v.
Ins. CO., 133 N. Y. 356. Moreover, "in the construction of contracts of insur-
auce that interpretation is to be adopted which is most favorable to the
insured." Ethinglon z. Ins. Co., 55 Mo. App. 129; Merrick V. Germania
Ins. Co., 54 Pa. 277. Forfeitures are not favored in law and courts will not
construe contracts so as to effect a forfeiture if they can reasonably do other-
wise. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Tomlinson, 125 Ind. 84.
MANDAMUS-TELEPHONES-COMPELLING INsTALLATIoN-BAWDY HousE.-
GODWIN V. CAROLINA TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CO., 48 S. E. 636 (N. C.).-
Held, that one who was avowedly a keeper of a bawdy house could not by
mandamus compel the installation of a telephone therein.
A corporation, public in character, and holding a virtual monopoly, is
bound to serve impartially and without unjust discrimination all who apply for
its service. This rule is applied to telephone companies. Missouri v. Tel.
Co., 23 Fed. 539; Tel. Co. v. Tel. CO., 4 Daly (N. Y.) 527; Tel. Co. v. Com.,
114 Pa. St. 592. Mandamus is the proper remedy for failure, Mahan v. Tel.
Co., 93 N. W. 629; State v. Tel. Co., 93 Mo. App. 349, although superseded
by statute in New York. Peo. v. Tel. CO., 41 N. Y. App. Div. i7. But
mandamus will not lie where the ultimate object is unlawful or against public
policy, or to compel unauthorized or illegal acts. Supervisors v. U. S., I8
Wall. 71; Chicot Co. vz. Kruse, 47 Ark. 80; E zparte Clafiper, 3 Hill (N. Y.)
458. In view of this latter principle, the correctness of the decision in the
principal case is indisputable.
MASTER AND SERVANT-AsSUMPTION OF RISK-MASTRIEBS COMMAND.-HREN-
RIETTA COAL Co. v. CAMPBELL, 71 N. B. 863 (ILL.)-Held, that a servant does
not assume the risk involved in carrying out a direct command of the master,
provided he exercises a reasonable degree of care.
The question here considered is one which has received much attention
from the courts and the decisions have differed so widely that it is very diffi-
cult to lay down any satisfactory rule of law regarding it. The present case
states the liability of the master more broadly than has been done in many
jurisdictions. The decision, however, is not only in harmony with the previous
Illinois cases cited therein but is also the rule in Missouri. Stefihens v. Han-
nibal &- St. J. R. Co., 96 Mo. 206. In many cases, on the other hand, it is
held that if the master had no knowledge of the danger involved in obedience
to his directions he is not liable. O'Neil v. O'Leary, 164 Mass. 287; The
Pilot, 82 Fed. III. Nor is his liability increased by the fact thathis command
was accompanied, (as in the present case), by abusive and profane language.
Williams v. Churchtll, 137 Mass. 243; Coyne v. U. P. R. Co., 133 U. S. 370.
When a servant cannot perceive, by the exercise of ordinary care, any danger
in obeying the master's orders, he does not assume the risk. Eicholz v. Nia-
gara Falls H. P. &- M. Co., 174 N. Y. 5i9. He may recover even if it were
apparent that some danger existed. Allen v. Gilman Co., 127 Fed. 609.
But if the act is one which an ordinary prudent man would not undertake he
cannot recover. Illinois Steel Co. v. Wierzbichy, 2o6 I1l. 2o1. The tendency
of the later decisions seems to be in favor of the rule as laid down in Illinois
and Missouri and to allow a servant to recover when he was exercising ordin-
ary care in obeying the master's direct orders and injury resulted therefrom,
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Shear &- Red. Neg. 5th Ed. Sec. r86; cited with approval in Allen v. Gil-
man Co., sufira.
PARTNERSHIP-REALTY-CONVERsION INTO PERSONALTY-EXPRESS AGREF-
MENT.-BARNEy V. Plxy-, 87 N. Y. Supp. 1038.-A partnership was formed topurchase marsh lands with the partnership capital, to be "reclaimed, and sold
and converted into money" and to divide the proceeds, profits and losses
among the partners in proportion to their several interests. Held, that theparties intended there should be an equitable conversion, and that the estate
of the deceased partner passed under his will as personalty.
This decision, which is based upon the fact that the articles of partnership
amounted to an express agreement that realty should be treated for all pur-poses as personalty, is in harmony with all the decisions in this country.
Maddock v. Astbury, 32 N. J. Eq. i8r; Mallory v. Russell, 71 Iowa 63.Where there is no such agreement, it is held in England, that there is an "out
and out" conversion for all purposes, the real estate, upon death of a partner,
going to his personal representatives. Essex v. Essex. 20 Beav. 442; Darby
v. Darby, 3 Drew. 495. The American rule, adhered to in all the states, is
that partnership realty is treated in equity as personalty so far as is necessary
to pay debts and adjust equities between the partners, and that the remainder
descends to the heir as real estate. Shanks v. Klien, 104 U. S. 18; Lowe v,.
Lowe, 13 Bush. (Ky.) 688
RAILROADS-REMOVAL OF TRESPASSERS-LIABILITY FOR INJURY.-POWZLL
v. ERIE RAILROAD CO., 58 ATL. 930 (N. J.).-A trespasser, while attempting
to board a moving railroad car, released his hold because of a brakeman's
throwing pieces of coal at him. Held, that the company was not liable forinjuries to him resulting therefrom. Hendrickson and Vroom, JJ., dissent-
ing.
The general rule is that a railway company is liable to a trespasser forc-
ibly ejected by its servants from one of its trains while moving at a dangerous
speed. R. Co. v. Reagan, 52 111. App. 488; Carter v. Ry. Co., 98 Ind. 552.
See also Rounds v. R. Co., 64 N. Y. i29. And a similar rule, without regardbeing had, however, to the degree of speed, was enunciated in Ry. Co. v.
Mother, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 87; while, in an action for injuries received by a
trespasser, it has been held that the only question to be submitted to the jury
was whether or not the trespasser was pushed from the train by a brakeman
while it was in motion. Thurman v. L. & N. R. Co., 34 S. W. 893. Whereone got upou a car, intending to ride without paying, -the conductor ordered
him off with a show of force, and he was hurt, it was held to be a question for
the jury whether he was in fault in jumping, and that his fault in getting ondid not constitute contributory negligence. Kline v. R. Co., 37 Cal. 400.
And ihen a boy boarded a moving freight train, and was ordered off while
the train was moving at a lower rate of speed than when he boarded it, it washeld a question for the jury whether the conductor's acts constituted negli-gence and would render the company liable. Thomson v. R. Co., 72 Miss.
715. In the principal case the court says: "It is absurd to say that by
merely gaining a foothold upon the moving train he could impose a duty upon
the railroad company either to permit him to ascend or to stop the train for
his convenience," but the decision seems to be based upon the theory that the
throwing of the coal did not actually force the trespasser to leave the train.
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WATERS-RIPARIAN RIGHTS-IRRIGATION.-CLEMENTS V. WATKINS LAND
Co., 82 S. W. 665 (Tnx.).-Held, that, as irrigation is not a natural use of
water, a riparian proprietor cannot exhaust the supply for such purposes as
against irrigation rights of lower proprietors.
This decision is noteworthy in that it practically aligns the State of Texas
with the common law rule, and squarely repudiates the doctrine of prior
appropriation developed and prevailing in a group of the arid states headed by
Colorado. Ohfenlander v. Ditch Co., 18 Colo. 142; Stowell v. Jrohnson, 7
Utah 215; Moyer v. Preston, 6 Wyo. 308; Bliss v. Grayson, 24 Nev. 422.
Farnham on Waters and Water Rights, sect. 6o4, says: "The Texas
courts have carried the right to use water for irrigation purposes further than
it has been carried elsewhere, and further than can be supported either by
principle or authority." See also Rhodes v. Whitehead, 27 Tex. 3o4. The
present case, while not entirely lacking support in the Texas courts, overrules
the established doctrine in that state. Tolle v. Correth, 31 Tex. 365, estab-
lished the doctrine that the rule of reasonable use will permit the exhaustion
of the water supply for irrigation as against other artificial uses, when the
need of irrigation is great and that of other artificial uses relatively unimport-
ant. The broad position of the court while attacked in Fleming v. Davis, 37
Tex. 173, and criticised in Mill Co. v. Ferris, 2 Sawy. (U. S.) 176, was
followed in the later decisions, the doctrine being limited, however, so that
the right to irrigate would be subordinate to the right of a lower proprietor to
be supplied for domestic purposes. Baker v. Brown, 55 Tex. 377; Irriga-
tion Co. v. Vivian, 74 Tex. 170; Barrett v'. Metcalf, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 247.
